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THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF FEDERAL
CITIZENSHIP AND COLGATE v. HARVEY
PENDLETON HOWARD t
In the sixty-two years intervening between the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the celebrated Slaughter-House
Cases 1 and the recent pronouncement of the same tribunal in Colgate v.
Harvey,2 it had been generally supposed by constitutional commentators
that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 3 was a dead letter-an innocuous declaration of fundamental
rights more forcefully and adequately guaranteed in other clauses of
the Constitution. In no less than forty-five cases fought out during
this period, the Supreme Court had been asked to invalidate state legis-
lation on the ground that it abridged the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States; and in none of them could it detect any
violation of the fundamental law.4  Even the basic guaranties of the
so-called Bill of Rights, safeguarded from federal infringement by the
first eight amendments, have been repeatedly held not to be protected
by the privileges and immunities clause against challenged state stat-
utes.5 Yet in Colgate v. Harvey the Court discovered that a state in-
come tax law which subjected to a 4 per cent. tax interest derived from
money loans, except loans made within the state where the rate of in-
terest was not more than 5 per cent., was invalid as an abridgement of
a privilege of federal citizenship: the right to lend money in a state
other than that in which the citizen resides, free from discriminatory
taxation by the latter state. The case was crowded out of the spotlight
by several other decisions invalidating important New Deal legislation
decided during the same term of court and has not received the critical
attention its importance justifies.
The surprising character of this decision, the novelty of its implica-
tions, the far-reaching threat to state power and the corresponding
expansion of judicial supremacy which it seems to presage, the im-
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portant questions it leaves unanswered-all these considerations invite
a reexamination of this almost forgotten clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the light of the cases in which it has been invoked in the
past, the judicial construction heretofore given to it and the possible
consequences of its broadened interpretation in this latest expression of
the Court's will.
I
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution became
operative July 28, 1868. On April I4, 1873, in the Slaughter-House
Cases, it was first interpreted by the Supreme Court. The facts of these
well-known cases may be briefly recalled. A Louisiana statute chartered
a private corporation, giving to it the exclusive right to establish and
maintain stock-yards, landing places and slaughter houses in the city of
New Orleans and providing that all animals intended for food should
be slaughtered there. It was the duty of the new corporation to permit
any person to slaughter in its houses at charges restricted by the statute.
The law was passed under the guise of protecting the public health and
provided for inspection by a state inspector of all animals intended to
be slaughtered. The butchers of New Orleans contended that the Act
violated the Fourteenth Amendment in that it deprived persons of lib-
erty and propertywithout due process of law, denied to them the equal
protection of the laws and abridged the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States. The Court sustained the statute. Speak-
ing for the majority, Mr. Justice Miller brushed aside the due process
clause contention with the observation that "the argument has not been
much pressed in these cases" and that "under no construction of that
provision that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can
the restraint imposed by the State of Louisiana upon the exercise of
their trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held to be a deprivation
of property within the meaning of that provision." 6
The privileges and immunities clause was the principal bone of
contention. The plaintiffs' argument, which failed to convince a ma-
jority of the Court, had run along these lines: the individual, as a citi-
zen of a state, had, before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
certain fundamental rights, privileges and immunities which were em-
braced in the principles of the common law and defined by state consti-
tutions and statutes; by that Amendment the citizen became primarily
a citizen of the United States, and only secondarily, by residence, a
citizen of a particular state; therefore, the fundamental rights, privi-
leges and immunities which formerly attached to him as a citizen of
the state in which he lived now belonged to him as a citizen of the United
6. 83 U. S. at 8o-8i.
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States, and, by force of the Amendment, were no longer subject to
abridgement by the states. Only by this construction, it was main-
tained, could the privileges and immunities clause be given any binding
effect whatsoever. This argument, of course, put squarely before the
Court the fundamental question whether or not the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment had placed the so-called "police powers" of the
states within the direct legislative definition and control of the Federal
Government, since by the Amendment Congress was authorized to en-
force its provisions by appropriate legislation. If the Court had con-
strued the right alleged to have been violated as a federal right, Congress
would have been empowered to define it, and all other rights of a simi-
lar nature, to impose penalties for their violation, and thus to invade
the wide domain of state police power. As Professor W. W. Wil-
loughby puts it, "To have granted the contention of the plaintiffs would
thus have made Congress, instead of the state legislatures, the possible
source of the great body of private laws by which the citizen is gov-
erned." 7
Mr. Justice Miller repudiated this construction of the privileges
and immunities clause in no uncertain terms. He pointed out that the
Fourteenth Amendment implies and by its language recognizes a dis-
tinction which had always existed between state and federal citizenship,
and that only privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,
and not those of citizens of the states, are safeguarded from abridge-
ment by state legislation. "Was it the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment," he asked, "by the simple declaration that no state should
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security and protec-
tion of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the states to
the Federal Government? And where it is declared that Congress shall
have the power to enforce that article, was it intended to bring within
the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore be-
longing exclusively to the states? All this and more must follow, if the
proposition of the plaintiffs in error be sound. For not only are these
rights subject to the control of Congress whenever in its discretion any
of them are supposed to be abridged by state legislation, but that body
may also pass laws in advance, limiting and restricting the exercise of
legislative power by the states, in their most ordinary and useful func-
tions, as in its judgment it may think proper on all such subjects. And
still further, such a construction followed by the reversal of the judg-
ments of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in these cases, would consti-
tute this Court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the states, on
7. I WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1929) 239.
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the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as
it did not approve as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the
time of the adoption of this Amendment. . . . But when, as in the
case before us, these consequences are so serious, so far-reaching and
pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit of our
institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the state govern-
ments by subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of
powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the most ordinary
and fundamental character; when in fact it radically changes the whole
theory of the relations of the state and Federal governments to each
other and of both these governments to the people; the argument has a
force that is irresistible in the absence of language which expresses such
a purpose too clearly toadmit of doubt. We are convinced that no such
results were intended by the Congress which proposed these amend-
ments, nor by the legislatures of the states which ratified them." 8
Chief Justice Chase and Justices Field, Swayne and Bradley were
unable to agree with this disposition of the case. In their view the re-
strictive definition adopted by the majority of the Court rendered the
privileges and immunities clause nugatory. Thus Mr. Justice Field, in
his dissenting opinion argued: "The Amendment does not attempt to
confer any new privileges or immunities upon citizens, or to enumerate
or define those already existing. It assumes that there are such privi-
leges and immunities which belong of right to citizens as such, and or-
dains that they shall not be abridged by state legislation. If this inhibi-
tion has no reference to privileges and immunities of this character, but
only refers . . . to such privileges and immunities as were before
its adoption specially designated in the Constitution or necessarily im-
plied as belonging to citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle
enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited
Congress and the people on its passage. With privileges and immuni-
ties thus designated no state could ever have interfered by its laws, and
no new constitutional provision was required to inhibit such interference.
The supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of the United States
always controlled any state legislation of that character. But if the
Amendment refers to the natural and inalienable rights which belong to
all citizens, the inhibition has a profound significance and conse-
quence." 9
In the last sentence above quoted we learn the dissenting justices'
conception of the true meaning of the disputed clause. The privileges
and immunities protected from abridgement by the Amendment are
"the natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens". Mr.
8. 83 U. S. at 77-78.
9. Id. at 96.
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Justice Field went even further. He quoted with approval from the
opinion of Mr. Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryel. 10 "The in-
quiry is", said the justice in that case, "what are the privileges and im-
munities of citizens in the several states? We feel no hesitation in con-
fining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are in
their nature fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the
citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time
of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign." 11 Mr. Justice
Washington was construing the language of Article IV, Section 2,
Clause i of the Constitution which provides that "the citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states". In Corfield v. Coryell, despite the language of the Con-
stitution, it was held that the clause did not mean that a state must per-
mit citizens of other states to enjoy all the rights or privileges it ac-
corded to its own citizens but only those which were fundamental in
character. Thus New Jersey might permit its own citizens to gather
clams and oysters from the waters of the state and deny the privilege to
citizens of other states.
In the opinion of Mr. Justice Field and the other dissenters, there-
fore, there were certain "fundamental" rights, privileges and immuni-
ties which belong "of right" to the citizens of the United States and
which, by force of the Amendment, were now protected from abridge-
ment by state legislation. These privileges and immunities were for
the judiciary to define and delimit as the cases arose for decision. This
io. 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,230 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1823).
iI. Id. at 551. Justice Washington continued as follows: "What these fundamental
principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may,
however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the
government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject never-
theless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good
of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any
other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to
claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any
kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or per-
sonal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other
citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges
deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated
and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised.
These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges
and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each state, in every other
state, was 'manifestly calculated . . . 'the better to secure and perpetuate mutual
friendship and intercourse among the people of the different states of the Union'." The
justice was here enunciating the well-known doctrine of "natural" or "inalienable"
rights in all its vague and nebulous character. Most of the rights here enumerated,
as well as those specified by Mr. Justice Miller in his decision in the Slaughter-House
Cases, are rights not only of citizens but of all persons, guaranteed against invasion by
other clauses of the Constitution. For a list of privileges and immunities, see LiEN,
PRIVIEGES ANRD IMMUNITIES OF CITIZE1S OF THE UNITED STATES (1913) 80-81.
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is what Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the majority, meant when he
said that the construction favored by the minority would constitute the
Supreme Court "a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the states"
and "on the civil rights of their own citizens". The meaning of such
vague and cabalistic words as "fundamental", "natural" and "inalien-
able" is of course what the courts wish to read into them.
Professor Dudley 0. McGovney has pointed out in an interesting
article that the justices who dissented in the Slaughter-House Cases, in
accepting and making their own this "fundamental rights" definition of
privileges and immunities used in interpreting Article IV, Section 2,
Clause i, were fully aware of the vastly different effect which the adop-
tion of it as a definition of privileges and immunities in the Fourteenth
Amendment would necessarily have.12 Under the construction given
Article IV, Section 2, Clause i, a state was not prevented from taking
away from its own citizens any privilege or immunity which it had
previously given or recognized. The Court had merely said to the
state: Whatever fundamental privileges and immunities you grant to
your own citizens, you must also grant to citizens of other states who
come within your borders or transact business therein. The dissenting
justices were now prepared to go a step further and incorporate this
concept of "fundamental rights" into the privileges and immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, if the dissenters
had had their way the Court would have said to the state: There are cer-
tain "fundamental" and "inalienable" rights which in the past you have
either explicitly granted your citizens or recognized by implication; we
will tell you from time to time what these rights are and you cannot in
the future take them away or interfere with their enjoyment.
II
That the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases rendered the privi-
leges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a dead letter
was soon recognized by the courts and constitutional commentators.13
12. McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment (igi8)
4 IOWA L. BULL. 219, 229.
13. In charging a grand jury shortly after the decision Circuit judge Emmons
said: "With the fact that this interpretation was equivalent to expunging it [the privi-
leges and immunities clause] from the amendments altogether we have nothing to do.
It is true, unquestionably, that any violation of any privilege or immunity protected by
the federal constitution, by the state, could be punished and redressed by congressional
law before the adoption of this amendment. As now judicially read by the court of last
resort, it leaves the organic law in this regard precisely where it was before. It is one
of those constructions, often resorted to, to prevent consequences serious and revolu-
tionary, which courts believe were not contemplated by legislatures who pass laws, and
by the people who adopt constitutions." 3o Fed. Cas. No. 18,26o, at ioo6 (W. D. Tenn.
1875). See the interesting discussion in 3 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY (1922) c. 32. See also BRANNON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1901) 62, 63; I WILLOUGHBY, Op. cit. supra note 7, § 136. A still narrower construc-
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In the language of Justice Field, above quoted, it became "a vain and
idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily
excited Congress and the people on its passage". 14  The effect of the
decision was to forbid the states from abridging any privilege or im-
munity granted to citizens of the United States by the Federal Consti-
tution or by federal statutes or treaties. This result, of course, had al-
ready been achieved by the "supremacy clause" of Article VI, Section 2.
As a matter of fact, the supremacy clause is considerably broader in
scope because it serves to protect the alien, as well as the citizen, and not
merely from state legislation but from state action of any kind which
infringes upon any right conferred by federal law.
Viewed from the vantage ground of intervening time, the decision
in the Slaughter-House Cases seems today a lesson in judicial self-
restraint which the Supreme Court would do well to study. The far-
reaching, and often alarming, consequences of the Court's subsequent
discovery that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
could be utilized as a constitutional restraint upon the substance of legis-
lation 15 as well as upon forms and modes of procedure, and for the
protection of the property of corporations as well as of natural per-
sons,10 show what probably would have been the result if state legisla-
tion involving every possible civil right of a state citizen had been held
subject to judicial veto under the privileges and immunities clause. Per-
haps the fairest estimate of the judicial statesmanship of 1873 was that
tion, suggested by the language of the Court in at least two subsequent cases, is that
the protection of the clause is limited to those privileges or immunities which a citizen
possesses solely by virtue of his national citizenship, as necessary and exclusive con-
comitants of such citizenship. Thus, in Bradwell v. State, 83 U. S. 130, 139 (1873),
the next case decided after the Slaughter-House Cases, Mr. Justice Miller said:
there are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States,
in that relation and character, and . . . it is these and these alone which a State is
forbidden to abridge." (Italics supplied.) And in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 58I,
596 (i9oo), Mr. Justice Peckham used the following language: "Those are not distinctly
privileges or immunities of such citizenship, where every one has the same [right] as
against the Federal Government, whether citizen or not. The Fourteenth Amendment
. . did not add to those privileges or immunities." This narrower construction,
however, has not prevailed in the later cases; and it is doubtful if Mr. Justice Miller
intended to suggest any different interpretation of the clause in Bradwell v. State,
supra, from that laid down by him in the Slaughter-House Cases. See the careful dis-
cussion of this point by McGovney, loc. cit. supra note 12.
14. 83 U. S. at 96.
i5. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1877) ; Stone v. Farmers Loan & Trust
Co., 1x6 U. S. 307 (1886); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R. v. Minnesota, 134
U. S. 418 (18go) ; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897).
It was in Davidson v. New Orleans, supra, that the Supreme Court first indulged in
dicta to the effect that substantive rights of life, liberty and property are protected
against legislative deprivation by the due process clause.
16. Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific R. R., 1I8 U. S. 394 (1886); Covington
& Lexington Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578 (1896); Smyth v. Ames, 169
U. S. 466 (1898); Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262
U. S. 544 (1923).
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made thirty-five years later by Mr. Justice Moody, speaking for the
Court in the case of Twining v. New Jersey: 17
"There can be no doubt, so far as the decision in the Slaughter-
House Cases has determined the question, that the civil rights some-
times described as fundamental and inalienable, which before the
war Amendments were enjoyed by state citizenship and protected
by state government, were left untouched by this clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Criticism of this case has never entirely
ceased, nor has it ever received universal assent by members of
this Court. Undoubtedly it gave much less effect to the Fourteenth
Amendment than some of the public men active in framing it in-
tended, and disappointed many others. On the other hand, if the
views of the minority had prevailed it is easy to see how far the
authority and independence of the states would have been dimin-
ished, by subjecting all their legislative and judicial acts to correc-
tion by the legislative, and review by the judicial branch of the
National Government." 18
Until the decision in 1935 in Colgate v. Harvey, which will be dis-
cussed presently, the Supreme Court repeatedly refused to modify the
position taken in the Slaughter-House Cases. The distinction there
drawn between national and state citizenship and their respective privi-
leges was firmly adhered to, and the privileges and immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment was consistently construed as protecting
only interests growing out of the relationship between the citizen and the
National Government, created by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.1 9 For example, in McPherson v. Blacker 20 Chief Jus-
tice Fuller said:
" . . the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States are those which arise out of the nature and essential
character of the national government, the provisions of its Consti-
tution, or its laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof; and . . .
it is the latter which are placed under the protection of Congress
by the second clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 21
And as late as 1934, in Hamilton v. Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia,( 2 2 Mr. Justice Butler phrased the rule as follows:
17. 211 U. S. 78 (908).
i8. Id. at 96.
ig. Some state and lower federal court decisions have been decided upon the basis
of the "fundamental rights" doctrine rejected by the Slaughter-Holse Cases. E. g.,
State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, io S. E. 283 (1889) ; Ruhstrat v. People, 185 Ill. 133,
57 N. E. 41 (19oo) ; Meehan v. Excise Comm'rs, 73 N. J. L. 382, 64 Atl. 689 (19o6) ;
Strange v. Board of Comm'rs, 173 Ind. 64o, 91 N. E. 242 (Igio) ; Ratta v. Healy, i F.
Supp. 669 (D. N. H. 1932), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 289 U. S. 7oi
(1933).
20. 146 U. S. 1 (1892).
21. Id. at 38. Mr. Justice Moody used similar language in Twining v. New Jer-
sey, 21I U. S. 78, 97 (908).
22. 293 U. S. 245 (1934), 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 529 (1935).
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"The 'privileges and immunities' protected are only those that
belong to citizens of the United States as distinguished from citi-
zens of the States-those that arise from the Constitution and laws
of the United States as contrasted with those that spring from
other sources." 23
In several important cases the Court was urged to interpret the
privileges and immunities clause as imposing the same restrictions upon
the states that the first eight amendments to the Constitution impose
upon the National Government. 24  But this construction, which would
have resulted in the inclusion of the fundamental guaranties of personal
liberty contained in the Bill of Rights among the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, has been uniformly rejected. Thus, the following have been held
(either directly or in effect) not to be privileges and immunities of fed-
eral citizenship: the right of trial by jury in suits at common law, guar-
anteed by the Seventh Amendment; 25 the right to bear arms, guaran-
teed by the Second Amendment; 26 the right to trial by jury in criminal
prosecutions, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; 27 the guaranty
against prosecution for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, except
on indictment of a grand jury, contained in the Fifth Amendment; 28
the right in a criminal case to be confronted by witnesses, included in
the Sixth Amendment; 29 and the protection against compulsory self-
incrimination, afforded by the Fifth Amendment.3"
All in all, forty-five cases have gone to the Supreme Court in which
the argument was advanced by counsel that the challenged state legisla-
tion infringed the privileges and immunities clauseA1 In none of them
was the contention upheld. The Court has held-to give some exam-
23. Id. at 261. See also Mr. Justice Pitney's language, when speaking for the
Court in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 539 (1922).
24- In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 98 (I9O8), cited supra note 17, Mr.
Justice Moody said: "This view is based upon the contention . . . that the safe-
guards of personal rights which are enumerated in the first eight Articles of amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution, sometimes called the Federal Bill of Rights, though
they were by those Amendments originally secured only against National action, are
among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, which this clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against state action. This view has been, at
different times, expressed by justices of this court . . . and was undoubtedly that
entertained by some of those who framed the Amendment. It is, however, not profit-
able to examine the weighty arguments in its favor, for the question is no longer open
in this court."
25. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 9o (1875).
26. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886).
27. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (19oo).
28. Hurtardo v. California, I1O U. S. 516 (1884) (decision under due process
clause); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (igoo).
29. West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258 (1904) (decision under due process clause).
30. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (19o8).
31. See cases collected in Mr. Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in Colgate v.
Harvey, 296 U. S. at 445, n. 2. Ferry v. Spokane, Portland & Seattle Ry., 258 U. S.
314 (1922), was omitted from this list.
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pies-that it is not a privilege of federal citizenship to practice law in
a state court; 32 to sell or possess intoxicating liquor; 33 to vote in elec-
tions; 34 to be released from detention by state authorities after having
been forcibly and illegally abducted from another state and indicted for
felony; '5 to be protected from a state statute substituting punishment
of death by electricity for hanging; 31 to be protected from a state stat-
ute providing for solitary confinement, upon conviction of a capital
offense, until imposition of the death penalty; 37 to carry dangerous
weapons in violation of a state law; 38 to be protected from a state stat-
ute providing for separate railway coaches for white and colored pas-
sengers; 39 to be protected from a state statute imposing a license tax
upon emigrant aliens; 40 to be protected from a state transfer tax law
construed as subjecting to taxation remainders created by a will before
the precedent estates terminate and the remainders vest in possession; 41
to use representations of the national flag upon articles of merchandise
for advertising purposes; 42 to be protected from a state statute impos-
ing upon mine owners responsibility for defaults of mine managers and
mine examiners who are required to hold licenses from the state; 43 to
be protected from a state statute under which a telegraph company can-
not limit its liability for negligent failure to deliver a telegram to a per-
son in another state; 44 to be protected from a state law allowing re-
covery by an injured railway employee in spite of contributory
negligence, where his negligence is slight and that of the company
gross; 45 to deal in junk and metals without making diligent inquiry as
to their legal status; 46 to enroll as a student in a state university with-
out renouncing previous affiliation with a college fraternity; 47 to graze
sheep on the federal public domain; 48 to attend a state university with-
32. Bradwell v. State, 83 U. S. 130 (1873) ; In re Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116 (1894).
33. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U. S. 129 (1874); Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657
(1893) ; Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S. 446 (19o6) ; Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304 (1917).
34. Minor v. Eappersett, 88 U. S. 162 (1875); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S.
I (1892).
35. Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 70o (1888).
36. In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 (i8go).
37. McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155 (1891).
38. Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535 (1894).
39. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896).
4o. Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270 (igoo).
41. Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278 (1902).
42. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34 (1907).
43. Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U. S. 6o (1907).
44. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. S. 4o6
(1910).
45. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Castle, 224 U. S. 541 (1912).
46. Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 26o (1912).
47. Waugh v. Board of Trustees of University of Mississippi, 237 U. S. 589 (1915).
48. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343 (1918).
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out being required to receive instruction in military science; 49 or to
obtain dower rights.50
It is true, of course, that the "fundamental rights" doctrine spe-
cifically rejected in the Slaughter-House Cases later found its way into
the constitutional law of the United States through its adoption by the
Supreme Court in Allgeyer v. Louisiana 51 as a definition of due process
of law. The supposed need for more efficient judicial protection against
restrictions imposed by state lawmakers in their efforts to control public
utilities and curb the growing power of corporate wealth was found,
after considerable hesitation, in the occult words of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 52  In the All-
geyer case-the first in which the Court relied upon the "liberty of con-
tract" concept as a ground for invalidating a statute-Mr. Justice Peck-
ham, speaking for the Court, quoted with approval expressions of Mr.
Justice Bradley in Butchers' Union Slaughter-House and Live-Stock
Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House
Co.55 which were merely repetitions of statements in his dissenting opin-
ion in the Slaughter-House Cases. Through an increasingly elastic
interpretation of the due process and equal protection clauses, many so-
called "fundamental rights" have been judicially safeguarded against
state action which has been characterized as "arbitrary", "capricious",
or "unreasonable". It is probable that some of these rights would have
been classified as privileges and immunities of national citizenship if the
Slaughter-House Cases had been decided differently. It is significant,
however, that prior to the decision in Colgate v. Harvey, whenever the
issue of privileges and immunities under the Fourteenth Amendment
was raised, the Court rigidly adhered to the definition laid down in the
Slaughter-Houses Cases.
III
In Colgate v. Harvey the Supreme Court was asked to pass upon
the validity of a provision of the Vermont Income and Franchise Tax
49. Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293 U. S. 245 (1934), 83 U.
OF PA. L. REV. 529 (1935).
50. Ferry v. Spokane, Portland & Seattle Ry., 258 U. S. 314 (1922).
51. 165 U. S. 578 (1897).
52. See 3 WILLOUGHBY, op. cd. supra note 7, c. XCI; Corwin, The Doctrine of
Due Process of Law Before the Civil War (1911) 24 H.Av. L. REV. 366, 46o; Corwin,
The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment (1go9) 7 Mrcr. L. REv. 643.
53. III U. S. 746, 764 (1884). Mr. Justice Field had evidently foreseen the pos-
sibilities of the due process clause in this respect much earlier since he in effect relied
upon it in his dissent in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 136 (1876). It was in the next
term after Munn v. Illinois was decided that Mr. Justice Bradley, in a concurring opin-
ion in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 1O7 (877), declared by way of dicta
that the due process clause could be used as a restriction upon the substance of legis-
lation as well as upon forms of procedure. On this subject, see Pound, Liberty of Con-
tract (io9) I8 YALE L. J. 454; Reeder, The Due Process Clauses and "The Substance
of Individual Rights" (1910) 58 U. OF PA. L. REv. 191.
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Act of 1931 " which subjected to a 4 per cent. tax interest derived
from money loans, except (i) income from loans made within the state
where the rate of interest was not more than 5 per cent., and (2) cor-
porate dividends earned within the state by corporations subject to the
local franchise tax. Colgate, a resident of Vermont, contended that the
4 per cent. tax on the interest he received from loans made outside the
state at a rate of interest less than 5 per cent. was discriminatory, in
view of the exemption of interest from like loans made within the state,
and a denial to him by the state of the equal protection of the laws guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as well as an abridgement of his
privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States in contra-
vention of the same Amendment. The Supreme Court of Vermont
denied the contentions of appellant and sustained the Act. 65
Speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland, the Court first upheld
the tax upon corporate dividends earned outside the state, from which
tax dividends earned within the state are exempt, on the ground that the
evident intent and general operation of the legislation was to adjust
the tax burden with a reasonable degree of equality. After almost but
not specifically deciding that the discrimination against loans made out-
side the state violated the equal protection guaranty, and after under-
taking to answer the argument that the classification was reasonable
because its aim and effect was to encourage loans within the state, the
opinion finally declared this portion of the Act invalid as an infringe-
ment of the privileges and immunities clause, "quite apart from the
equal protection of the laws clause".56 Pointing out that the purpose
of Article IV, Section 2, Clause i of the Constitution was to require
each state to accord equality of treatment to the citizens of other states
in respect of the privileges and immunities of state citizenship, Mr.
Justice Sutherland continued:
One purpose and effect of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, read in the light of this
interpretation, was to bridge the gap left by that article so as also
to safeguard citizens of the United States against any legislation
of their own states having the effect of denying equality of treat-
ment in respect of the exercise of their privileges of national citi-
zenship in other states. A provision which thus extended and
completed the shield of national protection between the citizen and
54. Vt. Laws '93', No. 17, p. 17.
55. 107 Vt. 28, I75 Atl. 352 (1934).
56. 296 U. S. at 426. Most of the commentators on this case in the law reviews
treat the decision as resting upon the equal protection clause as well as upon the privi-
leges and immunities clause. See, for example (1936) 34 MICia. L. REV. 1034, 3 U. OF
CHI. L. Rav. 5o6, 84 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 655, 46 YALE L. J. 926. One thinks the opin-
ion leaves the point doubtful. See Note (1936) 49 HIAv. L. REV. 935, n. 4. It seems
clear to me that, despite much discussion of the equal protection guaranty, the case is
decided solely on the basis of the privileges and immunities clause.
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hostile and discriminating state legislation cannot be lightly dis-
missed as a mere duplication, or of subordinate or no value, or as
an almost-forgotten clause of the Constitution.
"Reference has been made to numerous cases in which this
court has rejected or ignored specific claims under the privileges
and immunities clause; but since none of them relates to state legis-
lation even remotely resembling the Vermont law here challenged,
their collection and citation is without useful result, unless, as it
seems to be thought, these numerous unsuccessful efforts to give the
clause applications which fall outside its meaning show or tend to
show that the clause itself has become a dead letter. Such a con-
clusion is, of course, inadmissible . ...
"It follows from what has been said that-when a citizen of
the United States residing in Vermont goes into New Hampshire,
he does not enter foreign territory, but passes from one field into
another field of the same national domain. When he trades, buys
or sells, contracts or negotiates across the state line, when he loans
money or takes out insurance in New Hampshire-whether in do-
ing so he remains in Vermont or not-he exercises rights of na-
tional citizenship which the law of neither state can abridge without
coming into conflict with the supreme authority of the federal Con-
stitution." 57
In the opinion of the majority, the power to tax income asserted by
Vermont was, in the final analysis, the power to tax so heavily as to pre-
clude loans outside the state altogether. Therefore the discriminatory
tax here imposed abridged the privilege of a citizen of the United States
to lend his money and make contracts with respect thereto in any part
of the country.
Mr. Justice Stone wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion, concurred
in by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo. "Feeble indeed," he said, "is an
attack on a statute as denying equal protection which can gain any sup-
port from the almost forgotten privileges and immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 58 He recalled that the clause had consist-
ently been construed as protecting only interests growing out of the
relationship between the citizen and the National Government, created
by the Constitution and federal laws. He pointed out that the protec-
tion and control of intercourse among the states, not carried on in pur-
suance of the relationship between the citizen and the National Govern-
ment, had uniformly been left to the interstate commerce clause, to the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and to Article IV, Section 2, Clause i, guaranteeing to the citizens of
each state the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.
In no case since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, he de-
57. 296 U. S. at 431, 433.
58. Id. at 443.
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clared, had the privileges and immunities clause been held to afford any
protection to movements of persons across state lines or other forms of
interstate transaction. He continued:
"The reason for this reluctance to enlarge the scope of the
clause has been well understood since the decision of the Slaughter-
House Cases. . . . If its restraint upon state action were ex-
tended more than is needful to protect relationships between the
citizens and the national government, and it did more than dupli-
cate the protection of liberty and property secured to persons and
citizens by the other provisions of the Constitution, it would en-
large judicial control of state action and multiply restrictions upon
it to an extent difficult to define, but sufficient to cause serious ap-
prehension for the rightful independence of local government.
That was the issue fought out in the Slaughter-House Cases
with the decision against the enlargement. . .
"If its sweep were now to be broadened to include protection
of every transaction across state lines, regardless of its connection
with any relationship between the citizen and the national govern-
ment, a step would be taken, the gravity of which might well give
us concern. But it is necessary to go much further before the
present tax can be condemned. If protection of the freedom of
the citizen to pass from state to state were the object of our solici-
tude, that privilege is adequately protected by the commerce clause,
even though the purpose of his going be to effect insurance or
transact any other kind of business which is in itself not commerce.
But protection of the citizen's freedom of movement, whether by
the privileges and immunities clause or by the commerce clause,
will afford appellant no relief from the present tax. The record
does not show that he was ever outside the State of Vermont and
for aught that appears he acquired his extra-state investments,
which are in the form of negotiable corporate securities, by gift or
purchase in Vermont. Nor does it appear that the physical securi-
ties or payments of income of which appellant has had the benefit
have crossed state lines. He can be saved from the tax only by the
extension of the immunity to his income merely because the prop-
erty from which it has been derived, or the corporation paying it,
is located in another state." r1
IV
There seems to be little question that the majority of the Court in
Colgate v. Harvey deliberately repudiated the limitations placed upon
the privileges and immunities clause in the Slaughter-House Cases and
reaffirmed in later decisions. That the hitherto rejected "fundamental
rights" doctrine lies at the core of Mr. Justice Sutherland's thinking is
apparent from a reading of his opinion. He discusses, for example, the
business of insurance and says that it cannot be doubted that a citizen
59. Id. at 445-447.
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of the United States resident in and owning property in Vermont exer-
cises a privilege of national citizenship when he takes out in another
state a policy insuring that property or insuring his life. State legisla-
tion denying the privilege or imposing a discriminatory tax on the
transaction when it occurs in another state, would, he maintains, abridge
that privilege of citizenship. It is no answer, in his opinion, to say that
the citizen may resort to other clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
for protection. "The right of a citizen of the United States resident in
one state to contract in another," he writes, "may be a liberty safe-
guarded by the due process of law clause, and at the same time, ,none
the less, a privilege protected by the privileges and immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In such case he may invoke either or both.
This seems to be recognized in Allgeyer v. Louisiana . . . where the
court evidently thought that under circumstances not unlike those
just suggested the words 'liberty' and 'privilege' were interchangeable
terms." 60 We have seen that it was in the Allgeyer case that Mr.
Justice Peckham, in defining the term "liberty" in the due process clause,
quoted with approval statements of Mr. Justice Bradley in the Butchers'
Union Co. case, which were merely repetitions of views previously ex-
pressed by the minority in the Slaughter-House Cases. But the Allgeyer
case had held that the right of a citizen of a state to contract outside
the state for insurance on his property was one protected by the due
process clause from abridgement by the state; the decision did not turn
on the privileges and immunities clause. Mr. Justice Peckham had
simply utilized the rejected "fundamental rights" concept in defining
due process. Mr. Justice Sutherland and his colleagues are now ap-
parently ready to use it in defining the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States.
To say that the right protected in the Allgeyer case or in Colgate
v. Harvey is one arising out of the nature and essential character of the
National Government, secured to all citizens by the Constitution and
laws of the United States-to use the language of the cases reaffirming
the test laid down in the Slaughter-House Cases-is to stretch the mean-
ing of language beyond reasonable limits and, in the light of previous
decisions, is to achieve a result little short of absurd. Is the right to
lend money in a state other than the one in which you live more sacro-
sanct than the right to trial by jury in a criminal prosecution or the
right to be safeguarded against compulsory self-incrimination? Should
the one be held to be a privilege of national citizenship, protected by the
privileges and immunities clause against infringement by the state, any
6o. Id. at 433.
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more than the others? The Supreme Court has answered these ques-
tions in the affirmative.
The most disquieting aspect of Colgate v. Harvey, however, is its
uncertain scope. In holding that freedom to disregard state lines in
buying securities is a privilege or immunity of national citizenship pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment, does the Court mean to imply
that all discriminatory state taxation of out-of-state income is to be in-
validated in the future? In dealing with state action challenged under
the due process and equal protection clauses, the Court has invariably
used the criteria of reasonableness. In the instant case the tax was
adjudged invalid "quite apart from the equal protection of the laws
clause". Does the decision mean that henceforth any interstate com-
mercial transaction may not be subject to a discriminatory tax, no mat-
ter how reasonable or justified by economic circumstances the tax may
be, merely because it is labelled a privilege or immunity of national citi-
zenship? Are the states to be faced with the criterion of absolute
equality of taxation when commercial dealings across state lines are
involved? If so, the rejuvenated clause will become-to use the lan-
guage of Mr. Justice Stone---"an inexhaustible source of immunities,
incalculable in their benefit to taxpayers and in their harm to local gov-
ernment . .. 61 If so, the states are in danger of suffering a curtail-
ment of legislative power far beyond that experienced heretofore under
judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. If, on the other
hand, as seems more likely, the Court means to say that only "arbitrary"
or "unreasonable" or "capricious" inequalities in the taxation of out-of-
state income are to be subjected to judicial veto, it is difficult to see how
it has afforded any protection to the investor that has not heretofore
been given under the equal protection clause, the benefit of which ex-
tends not only to citizens but to all persons.
6 2
Nor does the decision appear to be needed in order to afford pro-
tection for miscellaneous interstate activities of citizens. As pointed
out by Mr. Justice Stone, the commerce clause, as construed by the Su-
preme Court, has heretofore been considered fully adequate to safe-
guard the right to pass from state to state, whether for the purpose of
carrying on interstate commerce or other forms of legitimate business
activity not so classified. In Crandall v. Nevada,63 decided before the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and before the full scope of the
commerce clause had been marked out, the privilege of leaving the state
61. Id. at 447.
62. It seems clear that the result in the instant case could have been reached under
the equal protection clause without resort to the privileges and immunities clause. Mr.
Justice Sutherland's language throughout the opinion supports such a conclusion. See
supra note 56.
63. 73 U. S. 35 (i868).
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for the purpose of approaching the seat of the National Government
and transacting business with it was held to be a right of national citizen-
ship not subject to impairment by the state of the citizen's residence.
Upon this ground the Court held invalid a state capitation tax on pas-
sengers transported out of the state by railroad or stage coach. Had
Crandall v. Nevada arisen at a later period it would unquestionably
have been decided under the commerce clause.6 4  But in view of the
fact that state taxation of net income derived from interstate commerce
has never been held to be a burden on such commerce or an infringe-
ment of the commerce clause, it can scarcely be contended now that the
privilege of carrying on interstate commercial transactions is impaired
by a tax on income derived from out-of-state investments. Nor is it
now open to argument that a tax on property, or the income from prop-
erty, is invalid as a burden on interstate commerce simply because the
property has once been, or at some time in the future may be, an article
of commerce. The claim that a state tax indirectly affecting interstate
transactions but not invalid under the commerce clause or under Article
IV, Section 2, Clause i, should be held to constitute a violation of the
privileges and immunities clause was specifically repudiated by the
Court in Williams v. Fears.65 In this case a Georgia license tax upon
persons engaged in hiring laborers for employment outside the state was
held not to impair the privileges and immunities clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In no decision prior to Colgate v. Harvey has the
Court ever deemed it necessary to invoke the privileges and immunities
clause in order to safeguard the rights of persons, whether citizens or
not, to engage in legitimate activities in the several states of the Union.
V
Colgate v. Harvey is a reactionary decision in the sense that it ex-
pands the scope of the judicial power under the Fourteenth Amendment
and seems to make possible the invalidation of every state statute
thought to infringe some "fundamental right" judicially classified as a
privilege or immunity of national citizenship. Indeed, if the case be
subsequently construed as laying down the criterion of absolute equality
in the taxation of interstate commercial transactions, it may be used
by the Court in the future as a precedent for further restricting the
power of the states to exercise social control over economic enterprise
and industrial organization through the exertion of the taxing power.
64. "No one could doubt that if the decision [in Crandall v. Nevada] had been
made at any time after Railroad Co. v. Maryland . . . and until the present moment,
it would have been rested on the commerce clause." Mr. Justice Stone in his dissent in
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. at 444.
65. 179 U. S. 270 (9oo).
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The issues presented in such cases are, I think, too vital and contro-
versial to make wise or expedient solutions by judicial fiat--especially
a fiat announced by a divided Court in which considerations of social
and economic policy often profoundly influence the results. Solutions
of economic problems should come from the political branches of gov-
ernment rather than the courts. Legislation demonstrated to be eco-
nomically unsound can be repealed or modified and a policy then adopted
that will meet the tested needs of experience.
If, however, we accept the construction that the decision is based
merely on the unreasonableness of the discrimination involved in the
taxing policy of Vermont, Colgate v. Harvey seems to be a wholly un-
necessary pronouncement because the same result could have been
reached under the equal protection clause. To borrow the forceful
words of Mr. Justice Stone: "If the exemption does not merit con-
demnation as a denial of the equal protection which the Fourteenth
Amendment extends to every person, nothing can be added to the vehe-
mence or effectiveness of the denunciation by invoking the command
of the privileges and immunities clause." Il The commerce clause, the
impairment of contracts clause, and the due process and equal protection
clauses, as judicially construed, furnish ample protection to business,
industry and private property against the arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of state legislative power or unconstitutional attempts by the
states to impose burdens on interstate commerce. It will be a result
fraught with peril to democratic institutions if any portion of the social
control thus far permitted under these clauses of the Constitution is
denied in the future under the privileges and immunities clause.
It is of course always hazardous to predict the future course of
judicial decision or the alignment of justices in the Supreme Court of
the United States. Trends discernible in recent decisions validating
important social legislation, however, point to another period of judicial
self-restraint in dealing with the enactments of legislative bodies remi-
niscent of the Taney tradition. It is of some significance that two mem-
bers of the Court who helped form the majority in Colgate v. Harvey
-one of them the writer of the opinion-have since retired from the
judicial stage. In view of the uncertain scope and precedent-shattering
character of the decision, perhaps even conservatives will not greatly
mourn if this product of the judicial statesmanship of 1935 is permitted
to slumber in deserved repose.
66. 296 U. S. at 450.
